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GEOLOGY, POTENTIALITY, SPECULATION: On the
Indeterminacy of First Oil
GISA WESZKALNYS
London School of Economics
In December 2011, Televisa˜o Santomense, the state-run TV channel of Sa˜o
Tome´ and Prı´ncipe, dedicated its chat show Portas Abertas to the topic of petro-
leum. One of the stylish young hosts posed the following question to the experts
who had been invited to discuss the issue: “How can we, the Santomean people,
the palaieˆs [women fish vendors], fishermen, journalists, lawyers, and taxi drivers
who are not part of the State, benefit from petroleum?” She continued: “How
can people know whether Sa˜o Tome´ and Prı´ncipe has any petroleum?” The first
expert to reply was the chemical engineer Osvaldo Abreu, whom I knew well
from my fieldwork in the African Atlantic island state. Osvaldo had previously
been a technical director at Sa˜o Tome´ and Prı´ncipe’s National Oil Agency, but
he had since moved to work for an international company offering scientific data
services for the oil industry. Now Osvaldo summed up the riddle of fifteen years
or more of inconclusive oil exploration:
We are dealing with a scientific matter that is complicated because it happens
out of our sight. We are dealing with a geological matter that is found in
the subsoil while we are here, above ground. We are dealing with petroleum
in an imagined form. And people keep imagining, predicting, and hoping
that what we hold in our minds or in our imagination or in the results of
the studies we have done is true.
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What can this quotidian instance of television entertainment tell us about the
nature of petroleum exploration on the periphery of established zones of extrac-
tion and global markets? Osvaldo’s response reflects a vibrant concern with the
potentiality of matter that lies at the heart of petroleum production. But realizing
this potential has been touch and go.
My research in Sa˜o Tome´ and Prı´ncipe (STP) started in 2007, a decade after
the Santomean government had signed an ill-conceived agreement for petroleum
exploration with the U.S.-based Environment Remediation Holding Company
(ERHC). During extended fieldwork and follow-up visits, I talked to ordinary
Santomeans, international advisors, industry representatives, and the mid-level
bureaucrats of STP’s National Oil Agency, including Osvaldo. At a time when
the Gulf of Guinea was consolidated as Africa’s petroleum frontier and global oil
prices peaked, there was much bafflement that STP’s oil exploration had not
taken off as initially expected. This article seeks to work out a partial answer to
this apparent contradiction by drawing on ethnographic observations and archival
research. But rather than asking why there is no oil in STP, I query the persistent
notion that there might be. I use what the oil industry calls “first oil” as a heuristic
to examine how a notion of petroleum potential is generated and sustained in the
face of the contradictory dynamics of contemporary oil exploration. I show that
first oil is a protracted and precarious achievement based on a speculative epis-
temology and reliant on specific technical, legal, and commercial practices and
devices with surprisingly incongruous effects. Instruments that aim to facilitate
petroleum production—such as contracts, exploration zones, and test wells—
thus become gestures of resource potentiality without compelling a predeter-
mined outcome. They give shape to a dispersed matter whose existence, in STP,
has continued to be doubted.
FIRST OIL
The phenomenon of first oil makes the notion of indeterminate potential
readily apparent. First oil barely needs defining. In the jargon of petro-industry
experts, first oil refers to the initial oil pumped from a newly commercialized
exploration well. It acts on forms of speculative knowledge—knowledge that is
necessarily incomplete, based on uncertain and partially obscured evidence, and
that occasionally makes “less than rational connections between means and ends”
(Comaroff and Comaroff 2000, 310). It signifies the transformation of zigzags of
geophysical measurements, fuzzy stratigraphies of seismic surveys, well logs, and
drilling cores into economic value. It engages one or more capital-, technology-,
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and knowledge-intensive investment projects that are the indispensable but in-
herently risky “motor[s] of capitalist wealth creation” (Røyrvik 2011, 5). Its as-
sociated myths of serendipity, sweaty labor, and persistence provide a measure
of the high risk involved and the abundant capacity for failure.
Significantly, a growing number of discoveries of conventional hydrocarbons
are now made in deepwater offshore reserves, such as those presumed in the
maritime zones surrounding STP, at depths between 1,500 and 4,000 meters
(IEA 2013).1 Offshore oil, as Hannah Appel (2012) argues, promises to render
profit “frictionless” through the deployment of specialist personnel, infrastruc-
tures, and contractual regimes that, however imperfectly, seek to disentangle
industry operations from local ecologies, social inequalities, and violent conflicts
(see Ferguson 2005). However, current deepwater offshore success rates lie any-
where between 10 and 15 percent (Nelson et al. 2013). Buried deep under the
ocean floor and humanly accessible only with costly technologies, the precise
location, size, and quality of oil prospects are notoriously difficult to pin down.
Many wells end up as dry holes (that is, technical but not commercial discoveries),
as indeed they have in STP, where nearly two decades of oil exploration by both
small independent companies and multinationals such as Chevron Texaco have
not yielded any significant results. In engaging the “concrete specificity of the
industry” (Appel 2012, 693), my analysis is therefore concerned with how off-
shore can imply loss as much as profit.
Oil’s successful valorization has been largely taken for granted in the inter-
disciplinary literature on hydrocarbons, despite an increasingly pervasive sense of
their uncertain future. The anticipated lack of hydrocarbons, or indeed their
carefully concealed abundance, has given rise to anxious projections in the industry
(Labban 2010). In addition, scholars have highlighted oil’s illusory effects, that
is, the mirage of prosperity oil may generate in the economies of producer states,
where fantasies of progress are displaced by deception and violence (Apter 2005;
Coronil 1997; Watts 2009). These effects have often been associated with oil’s
ready transubstantiation into monetary wealth. Oil rents, alongside oil extrac-
tion’s low requirement for labor and its marked separation from other domestic
economic activity, may create the impression that “riches reside directly in nature”
(Coronil 1997, 389). This quality of oil appears to have intensified as petroleum
markets and global financial markets become fused ever more tightly (Appel 2012;
Labban 2010). From this perspective, oil now supports national and global econ-
omies less as an artifact of productive labor than as rents, petrodollars, and spec-
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ulative gain, and as a result has “ceased to be identified as a material substance”
(Coronil 1997, 390).
First oil, however, complicates this view. A central aim of this article is to
demonstrate that oil is both a measure of value in a globalized economy and a
geologic matter that can defy precision prior to, and even during, its extraction
(Barry 2014; Mitchell 2009; Watts 2009). It is an industry truth that oil reserves
are composites of economic probabilities, technological feasibilities, and geological
potentials (Mitchell et al. 2012): an imaginary of complexly distributed agencies
folded into each other. Future oil demand, engineering advances, and geoscientific
assessments of rock porosity, viscosity, and temperatures come together in in-
dustry practices, such as the so-called risking of reserves, which estimates the
probability of success. My analysis registers these multiple types of materials,
calculations, and modes of speculation mobilized here and how they can generate,
prolong, and obstruct petroleum’s potential. Specifically, first oil adds an under-
standing of resource exploration as an uneven and hazardous project. I trace this
unevenness through the long periods of dormancy characteristic of the industry
and their specific temporal regimes, which have rarely been the sustained focus
of social scientific analysis.
In an opinion piece written for a Santomean newspaper, Osvaldo analyzed
the winding road to first oil (Abreu 2012). A look at some of the country’s oil-
rich neighbors, he explained, showed that the type of risky investment that char-
acterizes STP today could bring spectacular success. However, in many cases,
including Equatorial Guinea and Ghana, large-scale commercial production had
been preceded by decades of work by exploration companies willing to take a
gamble, a multitude of dry holes, and lost (though eventually regained) capital.
Later I will examine STP’s own protracted quest for oil, starting in the nineteenth
century. Here it is important to note that first oil constitutes an expansive moment
in which the circulation of hydrocarbons gets readily overtaken by the circulation
of facts about them.
The story of STP is not unique. From Somaliland to the Arctic, notionally
recoverable oil is being explored at massive expense and with uncertain results,
leaving entire populations in a state of expectation. Insufficient capital, labor, and
expertise, political and institutional weakness, geological and ecological condi-
tions, as well as burst commodities bubbles rank among the factors that historically
have hindered or halted resource booms (Dean 1987; Nolan and Thurber 2010).
Because oil prices are so volatile, all investment in petroleum production is also
speculation. Finding oil anywhere makes for a protracted undertaking, but this
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holds especially true in areas without prior exploration and infrastructural in-
vestment. So-called wildcatters, often the first to open new exploration zones,
may take years to attract financial backing or larger companies willing to share
the risk. Meanwhile, suitable drilling sites need to be identified, concessions
demarcated, land cleared, roads built, drilling barges hired, and exploratory wells
dug. Geological knowledge has to be recalibrated with seismic surveys, well logs,
and core sample analyses. Blockages and delay, as I will show, threaten at multiple
points, from the negotiation of contractual terms to the delineation of concessions
and the actual drilling. Oilfields whose so-called prospectivity is only inadequately
known or that are too small to warrant investment may be left orphaned or
stranded. Achieving first oil may take years, decades, or might even face indefinite
postponement.2
First oil’s dramatic suspense recalls what Karl Marx, in volume 2 of Capital,
analyzing the circuits of productive capital, referred to as an “excess of time” or
“pauses” integral to certain industrial processes. Time, translated as human labor
in capital’s historical ontology, would ordinarily function as a measure of value
(Osborne 2008). Marx demonstrated the obstruction posed to capitalist value
expansion and accumulation, for example, by laborers’ need for rest, by seeds
sprouting in the soil, or by a shortage of necessary tools in the market. As a
result, productive capital is held “in readiness” but remains fallow, although this
fallowness “is a requirement for the uninterrupted flow of the process of pro-
duction” (Marx 2013, 647). The pause thus is the tacit driver of an accelerating
capitalist temporality: a problem to be avoided through managerial and techno-
logical change as well as credit systems in the interest of higher turnover rates
and profits. Yet from another perspective, as a type of temporal deferral, pauses
are partly generated by the multiple contradictions inherent in the dynamics of
capitalist production (Harvey 1989, 181–83; Labban 2010). I am interested here
in how we might open up the pause’s analytic possibilities ethnographically. In-
stead of charting capital’s inexorable progress, I ask how the pause reorients our
gaze toward the technologies of speculation, contingencies, obstructions, and
material specificities intrinsic to the capitalist project.
Arguably, first oil does not constitute a Marxian pause in any straightforward
sense. Its time is not empty, not devoid of labor per se, even if the material
transformations this labor generates can remain somewhat invisible. For example,
they may be about ascertaining potentialities, thus constituting geologic substances
as a resource. What’s more, the growing financialization of oil markets has led
to a steady emancipation of value creation from material production and the
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circulation of substances in physical space, observable, for example, in the dis-
sociation of oil availability and global oil prices, or the privileging of short-term
returns over trade and investment in corporate decision-making (Labban 2010).3
Yet these developments have not made the pause analytically obsolete. First oil’s
long lead-up time and decades of dormancy are still experienced as a rupture of
ordinary productive processes.4 They, too, can hold capital investment in sus-
pense—sometimes for a given period a company might spend on the waiting list
for a sought-after drilling barge, sometimes indefinitely. At the very least, an
analysis of first oil underscores the persistent “intimate relationship . . . between
productive enterprises or assets” and the creation of speculative and promissory
value (Ho 2009, 181; see also Appel 2012; Guyer 2009; Labban 2010, 2013;
Røyrvik 2011).
I argue that first oil’s Marxian pause is filled with what I call gestures.
Industry-specific instruments intended to realize petroleum become gestural in
the absence of significant commercial discoveries. I take my cue from Giorgio
Agamben (2000), who provides one of the most compelling discussions of the
gesture as a philosophical concept.5 He points to a subtle distinction between the
gesture’s Latin root, gerere, meaning to carry, manage, or conduct, and related
action verbs, including facere (making, creating) and agere (acting, performing).
The gesture, Agamben (2000, 57–58) notes, is where “nothing is being produced
or acted, but rather something is being endured and supported.” It is “means as
such.” In the case of first oil, gestures keep the pause prised open by materializing
an absent potential and promising future gain. They partake of capitalism’s gen-
eralized speculative epistemology, which can be retrospectively justified by ref-
erence to profitability (Harvey 1989, 344). By thus anticipating future value, they
provide reassurance and maintain the confidence that prevents investments from
turning into outright failure. This article will examine a series of such gestures:
the contract, the exploration zone, and the test well. Looking at the precise nature
of these instruments of first oil makes my inquiry into the pause a somewhat
more tractable project. But the necessary preliminary task is to explore how first
oil becomes a possibility in the first place, based on the observation of resource
potential. I begin by sketching two historical junctures—first, in the Portuguese
colonial empire and, subsequently, in the newly independent Santomean state—
at which oil’s potentiality was envisaged through the speculative techniques of
entrepreneurs, scientists, and state officials.
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THE SUBSTANCE OF SPECULATION
For the philosopher Graham Harman (2010), potentiality is a somewhat lazy
objectification of a propensity, that is, the not-yet-actualized capacities of things.
Harman, and others before him, have challenged us to pinpoint more precisely
the ontological status, say, of the lethalness of a piece of plutonium lying in the
desert, or indeed the capacity of crude oil to be a resource. In what ways, Harman
asks, can potentiality be said to be animated by the possible relations in which
things are entangled and yet to exist independently of them? To approach poten-
tiality empirically and ethnographically differs quite markedly from contemplating
it philosophically. Ethnography leads me to explore how potentiality, specifically
the potentiality implied by first oil, is constituted historically and implicated in
social praxis (Fortun 2008; Mazzarella 2010; Svendsen 2011). I will focus on a
specific set of techniques, the speculations of entrepreneurs, scientists, and state
officials that, from the nineteenth century onward, summoned a notion of petro-
leum potential. Since its inception, petroleum exploration has combined the bold
assessments of oilmen with the speculative fantasies of urban financiers and the
hypothetical inferences of a new breed of geoscientists in what an oil executive
of the time called “the gamble of drilling for oil” (Zimmermann 1933, 500; Lucier
2008). Speculation, in this sense, exceeds its narrower, contemporary definition
of a type of behavior pertaining exclusively to the domain of finance (de Goede
2005; Ho 2009; Ouroussoff 2010; Zaloom 2004). Instead, it comprises a het-
erogeneous set of practices that suggest possible modes of existence for the geo-
logical matter observed while it excludes others. Speculation, here, is an obser-
vation of potentiality, both in the sense of remarking on potentiality’s existence
and of producing new facts about it. In the following, I will examine the successive
speculations of a Portuguese colonial financier, a daring South African entrepre-
neur, state officials, and industry geologists. I highlight, first, the historical depth
to their acquisitive guesswork, and, second, the way that liquid samples, drilling
cores, and other geophysical materials gave it substance.
“A NEW SOURCE OF WEALTH”
In one of our first interviews, I asked Luı´s dos Prazeres, then the director
of STP’s National Petroleum Agency, to run me through the beginnings of oil in
STP. Prazeres, or Kapala as he is widely known, had been the agency’s director
since its founding in 2004. Originally trained as a pilot, Kapala became the coun-
try’s first minister of natural resources in 1999 and had worked in the oil admin-
istration ever since. His response to my routine question surprised me. Instead
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of pointing to the year 1997, which is often taken as the birth date of STP’s era
do petro´leo when the government signed its fateful contract with ERHC, Kapala
claimed that oil had already been identified as one of the islands’ hidden treasures
in the late nineteenth century. He pulled a pen drive from his pocket, stuck it
into his computer, and clicked open a document that turned out to be his manu-
script of a chronicle of STP’s oil. “I am writing a history of these developments,”
he told me.
Kapala’s account embeds the Santomean quest for first oil in a local history
of things where the conjuring of resources out of “wild nature,” so deftly analyzed
by Anna Tsing (2005), had long been a condition of being. Alongside the other
eastern Atlantic islands colonized by the Portuguese from the late fifteenth century
onwards, Sa˜o Tome´ and Prı´ncipe played a dual role in Portugal’s colonial project,
first, as entrepoˆts for the flourishing cross-Atlantic slave trade and, second, as
prototypes for the agro-economic exploitation of tropical nature in the form of
sugar, coffee, and cocoa (Mintz 1985). Diverse resource potentialities were rou-
tinely envisioned, exploited, and just as quickly dissolved or moved elsewhere in
ways that tied the archipelago into a globalizing economic system.
Oil surged into this extractive environment when older forms of land-based
potential seemed increasingly untenable. In his manuscript, Kapala referred to a
letter sent to the Portuguese Ministry for Maritime and Overseas Trade by Fran-
cisco de Oliveira Chamic¸o (1876), the founder and governor of the Banco Na-
cional Ultramarino (BNU), Portugal’s first colonial bank. In sprawling handwrit-
ing, blue ink on thin paper, Chamic¸o claimed that analyses of water samples taken
from a brook in A´gua Ize´, one of Sa˜o Tome´’s struggling agricultural properties,
contained 70 percent o´leo. The letter requested the ministry’s support in inves-
tigating this petroleum mine. “Opening for exploitation a new source of wealth
of this order,” the governor asserted, would be crucial for maintaining the pros-
perity of the colonial state. The BNU would be covering the costs of such an
investigation.
The governor’s letter documents the “conjuring aspect of finance” (Tsing
2005, 57), where enterprising actors stake out claims from material possibilities,
summoning new commodities in a process of market making. Yet it also under-
lines the precariousness of this project and, thus, of value realization on the
capitalist periphery. Chamic¸o’s conjectures were steeped in uncertainty about the
future of Portugal’s colonies. The BNU was a private bank aiming to foster
economic activity in Portugal’s overseas territories. Following Brazil’s indepen-
dence, the profitability of the remaining colonies had become a central concern
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Figure 1. Portrait of Francisco de Oliveira Chamic¸o, founder and governor of the Banco
Nacional Ultramarino. Image courtesy of the Arquivo Histo´rico da Caixa Geral de Depo´sitos.
of the Portuguese government. More those of a colonial company than of a
commercial bank, the BNU’s operations already merged finance with productiv-
ity. The bank furnished vital services and infrastructures, in addition to providing
loans to the ailing landed estates in Sa˜o Tome´ and Prı´ncipe (Nunes et al. 2010,
7). Accusations of embezzlement in the BNU’s own ranks and a Portuguese
banking panic aggravated its predicament. Most significantly, one year prior to
Chamic¸o’s letter, a slave-led revolt resulted in the hasty, if long-promised, abo-
lition of an increasingly indefensible labor system, thus threatening Portugal’s
plans to revive its island territories with capital injections (Clarence-Smith 2000;
Eyzaguirre 1986, 181–82).
In this context, new geological observations, though as yet unproven, were
intended to mobilize both state resources and capital investments with the ex-
pectation to counteract colonial deficits. Chamic¸o’s letter invoked a vision of
verticality that, as Bruce Braun (2000) has shown, helped re-site economic value
from the surface (land) to the subsoil. From Baku to Pennsylvania, a novel sci-
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entific epistemics inferred geological relationships and promised commercial op-
portunity. A´gua Ize´’s muddy specimens similarly gave visible and olfactory evi-
dence of o´leo as an absent presence that could be indexed to hidden geological
strata and source rock formations. A BNU envoy was sent to Sa˜o Tome´ to pursue
the matter, his findings now lost from Lisbon archives. Yet within two years,
Chamic¸o (1878) concluded: “Petroleum is a myth.” Shifting global tastes and
skillful political maneuvering had rather diminished the appeal of obscure subter-
ranean potential. Land owned by the Portuguese Crown and leased to so-called
forro (native creole) families, often without title, was sold to colonists for export-
crop production (Eyzaguirre 1986, 151; Seibert 2006, 40–41). Ever larger num-
bers of imported contract labor subsidized by the Portuguese state provided a
way around abolition. Once again, the lush rain forest that Santomeans call oˆboˆ
fell victim to sharp-edged machetes wielded by former slave traders and other
investors in search of new profit bases, and a cocoa boom catapulted Sa˜o Tome´
and Prı´ncipe, in spite of themselves, into the twentieth century.
“GETTING WARM?!”
Aside from Chamic¸o’s letter, the dusty box files in Lisbon’s Arquivo His-
to´rico Ultramarino also shelter the expectant applications for petroleum explo-
ration filed by Portuguese and foreign entrepreneurs in the 1920s, 1940s, 1950s,
1960s, and beyond independence in 1975. They constitute an extended mean-
while in which potentiality is reassured—first oil paused rather than wound up.
On long evenings in one of Sa˜o Tome´’s popular snack bars, Aı´to Bonfim, a
respected lawyer, would relate to me fragmented memories about his teenage
self offering budding English skills and local knowledge to Ball & Collins, a British
company engaged in onshore prospecting a few years before the Portuguese Em-
pire’s demise. Fifteen years or so later, now freshly returned from Portugal with
a law degree in hand, Aı´to landed the job of reviewing future exploration plans
for the newly independent socialist state in which nationalization and shifting
markets had brought the cocoa plantations to near collapse.
In the late 1980s, drilling concessions were granted to Christian Hellinger,
a South African entrepreneur with existing business interests in the island. I met
with Hellinger in Sa˜o Tome´ in 2007. Now in his sixties, he came across as
somewhat supercilious and intimidating with stories of his African exploits. Hel-
linger had owned diamond mines in Angola and, during the civil war, used STP
as an evacuation platform for his staff. How did he get into oil, I inquired. The
geologists from his mines had nothing to do while on evacuation, Hellinger ex-
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plained. He kept them busy with investigations of the petroleum hidden in STP’s
rain forest. Flicking through Hellinger’s archives, I picture him chatting over a
glass of whiskey with the men that claimed to govern STP, beckoning oil riches
buried deep under layers of volcanic rock, and promising perhaps a hotel or two
for foreign tourists, or an improvement of the president’s villa. I find among
telefaxes, contracts, and maps a clipping from an industry magazine dated April
1990 and reporting on an upcoming sale of offshore oil licenses in nearby Equa-
torial Guinea. A scribble in the margin—“Getting warm?!”—indicated that the
quest for Santomean oil may have been more than a pastime for underworked
staff. Hellinger commissioned various surveys and, with technology shipped in
from South Africa, drilled two wildcat wells. When the drilling shafts collapsed,
Hellinger had run out of money.
By the mid-1990s, structural adjustment and privatization, instead of reviv-
ing the plantation legacy, had tied Santomeans into new bonds of both debt and
profit. The Santomean state had entered a financial crisis and increasingly em-
braced risky investment proposals. The islands’ no-longer wild nature was up for
grabs. Land was distributed to former plantation workers, but a self-consolidating
political and business elite snatched up the best plots in collaboration with inves-
tors (Seibert 2006, 348), partly curtailing the reach of the reform. The country’s
governors and leaders were envisioning new resources to exploit. The “.st” In-
ternet domain was made commercially available, and companies marketing adult
content were given access to the country’s +239 telephone code. There were
plans to establish a Free Trade Zone. Meanwhile, the Atlantic sea could be remade
as an extractive space, beyond the islands’ narrow littoral fringe, beyond the
habitat of scalloped hammerheads, snappers, and flying gurnards, and beyond
where fishermen from STP had ever ventured.
***
In sum, speculation about resource potential thrives at historical junctures
characterized by the foreclosing of previous material possibilities while it opens
up others alongside new markets (see Tsing 2005). It comprises a tangle of things,
including economic crises, ideological struggles, epistemic and technical shifts,
but also human actors sensing new commercial opportunities. The abolition of
slavery prompted a brief search for less labor-intensive alternatives; the oil crisis
and the decline of established oil fields led to a move into unexplored territory;
technologies such as 3-D seismic, floating production facilities and ultradeepwater
drilling units, as I discuss below, improved the quest for oil offshore. Successive
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Figure 2. Pedro inspecting the remains of Hellinger’s exploratory well, Ubabudu-1, near Vila
Celeste, Sa˜o Tome´. Pedro helped construct the well in 1990. Photo by Gisa Weszkalnys.
speculations about petroleum, though not overdetermined by its geophysical and
geochemical qualities, were not unsubstantiated. They were observations based
on what people know, and on what they know they do not know (Walsh 2004),
summoning fragmented knowledge and bits of partially obscured geological mat-
ter. Data, cores, and samples of muddy water have been the stuff that held out
promise and gave substance to the possibility of first oil. For those involved, it is
what separates risky investment from mere wagering. It is the stuff from which
material potential is manufactured, engaging “vast faculties of anticipation, crea-
tion, innovation . . . and technology” (Røyrvik 2011, 95, 129; see also Bowker
1994).
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Figure 3. Hellinger’s drilling equipment, which is being stored in a warehouse in Sa˜o Tome´.
Photo by Gisa Weszkalnys.
As an observation of potentiality, speculation offers a mode of participation
in the opportunities that obscured matter portends. It goes along with a distinctive
temporal disposition that creatively contemplates possibilities, while excluding
others, temporarily suspending a need for certitude in the desire for dispropor-
tionate gain. In STP, speculation about future resources generated fresh alliances
between public and private actors. From Chamic¸o’s proposal to salvage an ailing
colonial territory to the wildcatter Hellinger’s ambitious venture, which appealed
to cash-strapped officials unversed in either petroleum geology or global markets,
different expectations readily converged on an idea of oil and its enabling capac-
ities, both collective and individual. In the face of mounting debt, oil has promised
to give a recognizable, sovereign shape to a weak postcolonial state struggling to
fulfill its functions. However, the developmentalist vision of oil offers only a
deceptive alternative to other, increasingly prominent types of speculative plan-
ning, such as the financial speculations of public deficits that have restructured
state-society relations in India (Bear 2011). Oil provides a powerful but risky
form of economic integration, marred by the disjunctive temporalities of state,
science, geology, and markets. It ties collective hopes to the “ethics of probability”
of corporate actors (Appadurai 2013, 295), whose capacity to tolerate market
CULTURAL ANTHROPOLOGY 30:4
624
volatilities, interruptions, and pauses so common to the first oil process is, usually,
vastly superior to that of a struggling African nation.
GESTURES
Many things have sustained the expansive moment of STP’s first oil since
the collapse of Hellinger’s venture. Kapala’s chronicle teems with a range of legal,
commercial, and technical devices that have thus filled the Marxian pause (Pra-
zeres 2008). Since the late 1990s, maritime boundaries have circumscribed the
new national asset, now located principally offshore; three licensing rounds al-
located access to it;6 mechanisms for good governance and transparency have been
implemented; and a series of agreements have defined the obligations of the
country’s various industry partners. The National Oil Agency, directed by Kapala,
formed part of this effort as the body charged with managing the technical aspects
of future hydrocarbon exploration (Weszkalnys 2011, 2014). These largely stan-
dardized devices constitute a composite sociomaterial arrangement of measure-
ment, connection, and qualification characteristic of the global oil industry (Barry
2006). They reflect a double logic of contemporary capitalist expansion, which
in addition to creating new sites of investment speculates as to their inherent
problems and failures.
In the context of first oil, such devices and the epistemic practices associated
with them acquire complex salience. First, they supply the tangible scaffolding to
the drama that attracts investment to what is largely a speculative endeavor (Tsing
2005, 63; see also Fortun 2008). Second, they thus provide an “informational
enrichment” (Barry 2014, 141) of geological matter, making it amenable to the
exploitative fantasies of states and their economic partners (Braun 2000). Third,
in the face of a sluggish exploration process, they become gestural. Like mea-
surements of a fetal heartbeat, they furnish hope by signaling dormancy, not death,
thus preventing first oil’s pause from turning into a failure or loss. Doubtless, the
industry instruments I examine here—the contract, the exploration zone, and the
test well—have been implemented at huge cost and with the specific aim of
generating real productive value. They are neither unintentional nor insignificant
(“just a gesture”). As noted earlier, what I seek to emphasize is the gesture’s
sustaining, rather than performative or creative, force (Agamben 2000). The
instruments I describe may well contribute to an experience of blockage and
deferral in the exploration process, and to date, they have failed to fulfill their
stated aims of transforming prospectivity into economic assets. All the while, they
have continued to signal things to come.
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The Contract
“Volcaniclastic rocks, igneous rocks, supermature rocks . . . Rocks uplifted
and intruded in the Neogene by the growth of those volcanic islands . . . Sand-
stones, shales, deep marine sediments deposited from the late Cretaceous to the
Oligocene . . . Oil-prone source beds lying deeper, away from the islands with
their modest porosity and poor permeability . . . Traps found in tilted fault blocks
surrounding the islands, requiring further seismic survey.” And finally: “conditions
that are likely to result in the presence of oil accumulations in the Lower Tertiary
in the offshore areas of both islands, although their possible size, and to some
extent reservoir quality, are at present speculative.” These are renderings of the
earth’s subsurface gleaned from the report of a British geologist hired by Hellin-
ger, which mediate between profit expectations, national interests, and the anal-
ysis of geological structures and processes (Barry 2014, 142). They are speculative
because they reference imperfect empirical proxies, unfit for scientific publication,
but providing a baseline for calculated risk. To geologists, they speak of petroleum
potential, maybe not on the island itself but certainly offshore. To risk-taking
entrepreneurs, they provide an encouraging base for estimations of likely gain.
On May 27, 1997, the Santomean government signed a Memorandum of
Agreement (MoA) with the little known oil company ERHC, which had no ex-
perience in offshore drilling but had acquired Hellinger’s geophysical data, drilling
cores, and claims that STP’s crude was of the desirable Bonny Light grade.7 The
MoA accompanied a contract between the two parties, with a validity of twenty-
five years and renewable thereafter. The contract underscored oil’s divisibility,
as financial asset and physical substance (Labban 2010). Rather than providing a
course for action, it established a promissory value, shaped by assumptions of
finitude and competition over access. The MoA granted ERHC some extraordi-
nary allowances in the exploitation of STP’s hydrocarbon resources. For a fee of
US$5 million, it assigned the company 40 percent of the revenues from future
oil. ERHC promised to raise the funds necessary to kick-start exploration activ-
ities. It would act as negotiator with any other company wishing to explore
Santomean oil, and earn a 5 percent fee from any payable bonuses.
The double obscurity of STP’s oil—both geologically obscured and its worth
not yet revealed by the market—thus allowed ERHC to adopt multiple roles vis-
a`-vis the Santomean state. Despite the company’s limited expertise and financial
resources, ERHC staff convinced the Santomean officials of their ability to carry
the project through. The company’s chief operating officer sported a Stetson hat
and cowboy boots on his visit to the islands when promising the Santomean
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government to raise US$100 million in seven months. Gestural moves supple-
mented these promises: a maritime boundary claim was filed, diplomatic passports
were issued to the supposed owners of a Montenegro bank, and in 1998 another
contract was signed with Mobil, later ExxonMobil. It granted the multinational
concessions in return for initiating seismic research in offshore territory, where
the key prospects were now expected to be located (Seibert 2006, 372). In
addition, ERHC and the Santomean government established a joint-venture oil
company to manage the upcoming petroleum activities. During the following few
years, ERHC and the Santomean government broke off, revised, and entered into
new agreements. Accusations of bribery and corruption flew through the air. In
2001, the company was acquired by the Nigerian businessman Emeka Offor, a
close ally of Nigeria’s president Olusegun Obasanjo.8
ERHC’s new Nigerian identity has added to the company’s reputation as a
dubious collaborator. More established multinationals have allegedly refrained
from bidding for oil blocks in STP’s offshore territory to avoid forcible cooper-
ation with ERHC, which still holds preferential rights in several Santomean oil
blocks. Imperfectly quantified oil potential began to produce some value for the
company.9 But for the Santomean state, ERHC’s involvement is deemed respon-
sible for a substantial loss of possible earnings, and critics now view it as a liability.
However, such argument benefits from hindsight, I was reminded by Afonso
Varela, the National Oil Agency’s former legal director. After all, he argued,
ERHC had effectively turned STP into a petroleum frontier at a time when nobody
paid attention. It had indirectly generated 2,723 kilometers of 2-D seismic data
of STP’s oil prospects, which proved indispensable in attracting additional inves-
tors (see Seibert 2006, 372).
The Zone
Petroleum geologists have a special way of inferring oil. They call it a seismic
survey. Such surveys involve a large boat towing air guns and a set of microphones
across the seabed. As they explosively void their air chambers, bubbles of energy
are sent out, propagating outward, hitting the seabed, bouncing up again, and
producing noisy traces. “Boom—boom,” Osvaldo aped the sound of the air gun
when recounting his experience of interning on such a mission conducted by
Petroleum Geo-Services (PGS), a Norwegian oil services company.10 Some energy
penetrates the seabed and returns, and some goes down and is never heard of
again. “Boom—boom.” The echo’s force vibrates through the vessel’s body
twenty-four hours a day, registered by Osvaldo’s skin, ears, organs, making it
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difficult to sleep. Physical encounters and measurements of time lapsed become
images at the geologist’s hand, like cut scans of a human body, slices through the
earth’s crust. They are images of temporality, density, porosity, latency, and odds
that may reveal themselves to the discerning eye. “They are at most like photo-
graphs of the moon,” explained a Scottish geologist, who had once advised the
Santomean government. No perceptible features, only light and dark. You can
de-risk prospects by interpreting seismic probabilities. But until you take a sample,
you cannot know what you have.
When ERHC took STP’s Prime Minister Raul Braganc¸a to the United Na-
tions Law of the Sea Commission in New York City to file a request for the
establishment of maritime boundaries, it was a nontrivial piece of technical assis-
tance. Filing boundary claims, as a legislative act, has important consequences for
the demarcation of new resource frontiers, as well as for the identification of
owners and their legitimate partners. Since the mid-twentieth century, the delin-
eation of exclusive economic zones (EEZs) has become an urgent undertaking to
control national “aquariums” of exploitable nature (Pa´lsson 1998). Here, the trans-
formation of nature into economic value depended on the capital of corporate
partners, but promised the extraction of rents and revenue by the state (Coronil
1997; Labban 2008, 41). Law No. 1/98, the outcome of the New York trip,
inscribed STP’s sovereignty over a series of living and non-living things down to
the exact geographical minute and second. Fish, metals, and hydrocarbons found
above, on, and under the seabed were recast as national assets to be cared for
and mined.
Dreams of sovereign substances and petroleum-based national self-suffi-
ciency soon met with challenges. While Equatorial Guinea and Gabon readily
accepted the suggested boundary of a Santomean EEZ based on a principle of
equidistance, Nigeria proved recalcitrant. It questioned the principle’s appropri-
ateness on the basis of its much larger coastline. Seismic surveys of STP’s offshore
hydrocarbon potential, carried out by a subsidiary of the global petroleum-services
provider Schlumberger (paid for by ExxonMobil), had located the most valuable
prospects in areas bordering Nigerian waters (Seibert 2006, 372–73). Three years
of protracted negotiations ensued. A first, second, and third meeting between the
parties was scheduled to put the technical arguments on the table. However, as
Kapala recounted, by May 2000, the negotiations reached deadlock. Illustrious
U.S. lawyers specializing in boundary disputes were called on to prepare a pro-
posal that they hoped would bring a truce. More legal research, more discussions,
more cups of coffee, and a final long meeting lasting from morning till midnight
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led to a critical item of bilateral jurisdiction: a zone managed jointly, but unevenly
split between the two states, with Nigeria receiving 60 and STP 40 percent of
any revenues possibly generated from it.
Figure 4. Map of the Nigeria-Sa˜o Tome´ and Prı´ncipe joint development zone, 2007.
Image courtesy of IHS.
The delineation of the joint development zone (JDZ), covering 34,450
square kilometers, proved a critical gesture, sustaining a notion of exploitable
potential and opening up possibilities for anticipatory gain from substances not
yet extracted. Now, exploration blocks could be delineated and allocated in more
transparent licensing rounds. The proximity of Nigeria’s rich oil fields seemed to
reflect well on its prospects. Some people saw benefit in Nigeria’s own vast
experience of oil, with 2.2 million barrels per day extracted from more than
1,400 wells located in around 150 oil fields. Staggering and impressive numbers
that cannot conceal what many Santomeans know about their big neighbor. Seem-
ingly lopsided and deceitful, the partnership has fed into a broader cultural per-
ception of Nigerians as worldly but cunning business operators. The auctions for
exploration rights in the JDZ provided empirical fodder for this truth. Especially
the second licensing round held in 2004 turned farcical the conventional wisdom
that auctions are foolproof instruments for establishing a fair and real price. In-
stead, it resulted in a report by STP’s attorney general—a document that is
probably STP’s most public embodiment of transparency to date (Procuradoria
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Geral 2005). The report alleged, among other things, clandestine decision-making
involving Nigerian and Santomean government figures and their advisors, as well
as the awarding of contracts to a series of Nigerian-owned companies without
credentials, and called for the annulment of the licensing round.11
Yet it would be wrong to think that the JDZ has rendered the Santomean
state completely inoperative. Rather, it has plotted out fresh networks of trans-
boundary relations. The authority managing the zone, the JDA, which has its
headquarters in Abuja, is the go-to agency for anyone wishing to invest in the
JDZ. It is a fitting enactment of STP’s absent oil—an inflated bureaucratic ap-
paratus with a budget of several million dollars per year, eating into STP’s limited
petroleum revenues.12
The Well
“To find oil, you have to drill,” runs the slogan on the website of Schlum-
berger, the oil-exploration technology pioneer. Tearing and chipping away at the
rock, the reserve is spudded, pressure released, and, with luck, crude emerges
in a great surge. Schlumberger perfected this prospecting technique in the first
few decades of the twentieth century, thus giving scientific backing to what had
previously been a fairly intuitive endeavor. Test wells made the world into a
laboratory, creating order out of unruly terrain whose “space and time could then
form the x and y axes of Schlumberger logs” (Bowker 1994, 109). Wells can
increase companies’ stock-market value by turning possible and probable into
proven reserves; but the geological conditions they reveal may also disrupt a
project previously deemed technologically feasible and economically sound.13
At the start of 2006, encouraging early signs from Obo-1, the first explo-
ration well in Block 1 of the JDZ drilled by Chevron Texaco and the lowest-risk
target according to the company’s technical expertise, made ERHC share prices
shoot up.14 Thousands of feet of steel had been lowered to perforate the icy-cold
sea floor, a drilling riser bringing up the mud, people busy operating the equip-
ment, measuring, analyzing, and ascertaining that the technology remained stably
connected in this floating environment. A press release broke the news. At 1,720
meters, Obo-1 “logged a cumulative total of at least 150 feet (45 meters) of
hydrocarbon pay in multiple reservoirs and provided important reservoir rock
and liquid samples, which need to be evaluated and integrated into the interpre-
tation of the Obo area” (Chevron 2006). Chevron’s expat representative, Tim
Parsons, recommended caution before commercial viability was proven: “It is too
soon to speculate about a date for the first barrels” (Macauhub 2007). With data
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so insufficiently analyzed and confidential, it would be unethical for company reps
to even start guessing what they might reveal. For the moment, the reservoirs
were deemed not to “justify economic development on their own” (Macauhub
2007).
Geological facts are easily drowned out by the cacophony of voices that say
otherwise. Tim, Chevron’s representative, was notably exasperated when we
talked in 2007 just after yet another article in a local paper quoted a Santomean
official at the JDA disputing Chevron’s assessment of its drill results. Yet for Tim,
the people to blame were not just irresponsible politicians trying to capture votes
and stave off International Monetary Fund (IMF) technocrats with myths of im-
pending wealth. Only recently, IMF economists themselves had published what
was, in his view, an equally irresponsible study that predicted millions of barrels
of oil in STP’s water (Segura 2006).15 They forgot about the geology.
Any announcement of “no oil” has been swiftly rephrased as “no oil yet.” In
2010, Chevron withdrew from the JDZ for reasons likely to have included a
careful balancing of geological prospects, technological possibilities, assessments
of future oil markets, and the company’s need to satisfy both shareholder expec-
tations and long-term crude supply for an integrated business. Hundreds of mil-
lions of dollars can be written off when corporate portfolio management and
financial markets seem to demand it (Labban 2013; Nolan and Thurber 2010).
The disappointment was temporarily relieved when the French multinational To-
tal promised a US$200 million investment to explore Block 1 of the JDZ in
conjunction with its adjacent Nigerian projects. A changed constellation of tech-
nology, economy, and science was expected to entail a new ability to create
commerciality.
Osvaldo, Kapala, and others shared the hopeful news with me in late 2012.
An IMF representative I talked to during this time felt confident that the country
would start producing oil within the coming five years. Only a few months lay
between my listening to these reassurances and Total’s eventual abandonment of
its JDZ acreage. Some observers suggest that Total’s withdrawal, alongside that
of other companies, might spell the end of Santomean oil hopes (Seibert 2013).
By contrast, Osvaldo was unabashedly optimistic when speaking, in a more recent
capacity as STP’s minister of natural resources, to a local newspaper in September
2013: “Companies have their politics, their profit margins and other [considera-
tions], and they act in accordance with their expectations. . . . We have confirmed
reserves [of hydrocarbons] in sufficient quantities to make [Block 1] viable” (Veiga
2013).
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CONCLUSION
First oil is a highly uneven phenomenon forged from contingent associations
of state, capital, science, and nature. To understand its unevenness, I have looked
to the periods of dormancy, what I call pauses, characteristic of petroleum ex-
ploration, especially in frontier regions where scientific knowledge is incomplete,
geological conditions challenging, and local regulatory frameworks and know-
how limited. Instead of portraying STP as a fait accompli overdetermined by
models derived from established oil producer states, I highlighted the indeter-
minacy at the heart of petroleum production. Full-blown oil nations like Nigeria
or Venezuela and their historical idiosyncrasies would make poor analytical lenses
for understanding the goings-on here. Despite first oil’s apparent suspension in a
vast sociospatial assemblage of hydrocarbon production, each instance of it re-
mains, like all capitalist production, a highly localized phenomenon (Braun 2006,
214; Watts 2009, 83).
One aim of this account has been to show that first oil’s unevenness in part
results from specific material constraints posed by geologic matter whose precise
contours remain largely opaque. In part, it results from the incongruous effects
of a distinctive speculative epistemology. State and corporate actors, independent
entrepreneurs and technical consultants, global legislators and financiers have gath-
ered around diverse yet interrelated modes of framing the sort of potentialities
required by capital’s desired expansion (Harvey 1989, 343). They include con-
jectures about exploration precedents, seismic measurements, and other “im-
measurable uncertainties” that have been a historical condition of corporate profit
(Ouroussoff 2010). A dispersed sociotechnical arrangement of instruments de-
signed to determine oil’s political, economic, and geoscientific parameters seeks
to reduce such uncertainties, for example, by establishing obligations between
contractual partners, geopolitical jurisdictions, and productive capacities. Yet
these instruments may inadvertently upend their stated goal of realizing hydro-
carbon potential and, instead, turn into gestures of absent oil. Such gestures are
unlike the “white elephants” that have come to embody the ambivalences of pe-
troleum economies as the purveyors of “a ‘sensing-is-believing’ ontology that
disguise[s] the absence of a productive base” (Apter 2005, 14). They also differ
from the spectacle of fraudulent evidence that props up the economy of appear-
ances (Tsing 2005). Neither purely symbolic nor instrumental, gestures rather
show a specific temporal ethics that attenuates or postpones failure. Importantly,
for all its tangible effects, STP’s first oil has also threatened to remain unrealized.
Contracts have created unsubstantiated value in lieu of liquidity. Maritime eco-
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nomic zones inscribe not sovereignty but geopolitical power play. Wells reveal
not resources but a lack of viability. The outcome, however, has not been the
collapse of STP’s first oil, but its continuing suspension, in other words, a sus-
tained pause.
Disruptions and deferred achievement color not just stories of resource
exploitation in distant times and places, inhibited, for example, by geographical
inaccessibility and complex local colonial relations. The contemporary entangle-
ment of productive and financial capital in the extractive sector has made the
pause an ever more relevant analytical consideration (Laban 2010, 551). The
recent slump in oil prices translated, almost instantaneously, into extensive cost-
cutting, sell-offs, reduced exploration budgets, and the postponement of produc-
tion across the sector (Adams 2015), affecting both established oil-producing
zones and hopeful new producers in Africa, where governments and ordinary
people continue to build their hopes on hydrocarbons. It has also had ripple effects
for copper, gold, and other minerals, where the huge capitalization required for
operations, along with the depletion of existing mines, typically long and uncertain
project lead times, and intensified price volatility in commodity markets already
anticipated such developments (Lee et al. 2012).
No doubt similar instances of pausing and gesturing can be traced beyond
the extractive sector. A quite different case in point comes from my earlier
research about an attenuated development project for a central square in post-
unification Berlin (Weszkalnys 2010). Nearly twenty years after the project was
first proposed, the square still lingers in a sustained pause. The primary gesture,
here, is the legally binding construction plan—a key bureaucratic artifact in the
development process. First formalized in the late 1990s, the plan was soon
deemed unfit for Berlin’s underwhelming real-estate market, and there were calls
to adjust it to present expectations. Yet developers seem desperate to cling to it
while constructing halfhearted proxies of the original. In a similar way, a host of
conceptual aids give shape to an envisaged aluminum plant, although the project’s
success cannot be judged until the plant has reached full production (Røyrvik
2011, 122). Special Economic Zones—proliferating from India to the Philippines
and STP—have been preceded by the erection of billboards, the dispossession of
local landowners, and the bulldozing and fencing of plots, which may or may not
achieve their potential in the future (cf. Cross 2014). And biomedical data is
collected, marketed, and mined in anticipation of future health benefits and fi-
nancial value (Fortun 2008). One might examine such processes of gesturing for
their material consequences, including the ways in which they bring substances
GEOLOGY, POTENTIALITY, SPECULATION
633
and money into circulation, conjure novel institutions, and reorder access to a
wide variety of resources. They may also generate a new politics feared, by
investors, for producing its own disruptions and delays by spotlighting shortcom-
ings of development projects or their unstable embeddedness in networks of global
finance. If as anthropologists we want to contribute to a more refined understand-
ing of how the ethics of possibility become caught up in the ethics of probability
(Appadurai 2013, 298), the pause is not a bad place to start.
I end here still in the midst of that expansive (and expensive) pause of STP’s
first oil. I am mindful that the moment I have described marks only the briefest
episode in its long existence. It is a moment when stuff, not yet extracted and
largely cut off from human interference, finds its many possible modes of being
(including its geochemical versatility, high-energy density, and ready transubstan-
tiation into monetary form) already anticipated by social practice. This is not to
essentialize the geologic matter. It is to distinguish the expansive moment of first
oil from discovery or invention as a moment of transformation (Harman 2010).
Whether STP’s oil is a speculative entity, primary commodity, or corrupt cur-
rency is not encoded in hydrocarbons per se, but suggests a complex encounter
of geologic matter with technoscientific, economic, and legal arrangements
through which resources are made (Richardson and Weszkalnys 2014). Potenti-
ality, here, presents itself both as “futures fold[ed] into presents” (Fortun 2008,
285) and as something stymied, marked by blockages and setbacks (Røyrvik
2011). It is the result of a process simultaneously ethically charged, materially
grounded, and temporally extended into an uncertain future (Svendsen 2011).
Recent efforts to open up STP’s exclusive economic zone to commercial exploi-
tation with seismic research, a licensing round, and production-sharing agree-
ments continue to act as gestures of the prospect of oil. In lieu of productive
value, they too hold out the promise of a profitable future. They invite us to
critically re-examine contemporary capitalism’s persistent claims to boundless
creativity. Instead, they highlight a multiplicity of speculative forms and temporal-
material realignments that emerge when things slow down while everything else
keeps moving.
ABSTRACT
This article uses what the petroleum industry calls first oil to examine the uneven
process of resource making on the margins of global zones of extraction. It explores
how the double obscurity of hydrocarbon prospects—both geologically obscured and
their worth not yet revealed by the market—generates particular material constraints,
CULTURAL ANTHROPOLOGY 30:4
634
pauses, and setbacks characteristic of petroleum production. The article draws on
ethnographic and archival material from Sa˜o Tome´ and Prı´ncipe (STP), where re-
peated attempts to explore offshore oil have yet to transform geological potential into
an economic asset. It highlights the incongruous effects of certain epistemic practices
and devices (contract, zone, and well) aimed at facilitating first oil by managing
uncertainty. As a result, they work as gestures of an indeterminate matter whose
existence continues to be doubted. [extraction; speculation; knowledge; mate-
riality; value; Sa˜o Tome´ and Prı´ncipe]
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1. More than half of new discoveries globally between 2000 and 2009 were deepwater
offshore (IEA 2013).
2. The production sharing contracts (PSCs) governing STP’s joint development zone with
Nigeria stipulate between eight and sixteen years of research and evaluation.
3. Oil also challenges conventional accounts of financialization. First, aspects of what is
now labeled the logic of finance—including, for instance, a dominance of joint-stock
companies (Lucier 2008)—have been constitutive of the oil industry from the start,
thus unsettling narratives of linear economic evolution. Second, oil constitutes a raw
material that remains fundamental to a vast number of life processes, while it simulta-
neously presents itself as a finite substance whose non-renewability seems to place it
beyond the capabilities of productive capital (Huber 2008; Labban 2010, 542; Mitchell
2009). Third, like industrial investment projects more generally, oil exploration has
also necessarily sought to resist subsumption by a financial logic (Nolan and Thurber
2010). One might even argue that oil, in the form of material assets and the labor
needed to produce, continues to be the irreducible bedrock of corporate financial value
expansion (Labban 2013).
4. Pauses extend to processes of extraction, transportation, refining, and so on.
5. The “formless” gesture constitutes a critical element of Agamben’s ethics of encounter
(ten Bos 2005). I develop the concept quite differently from Agamben’s philosophical
project.
6. The first two licensing rounds in 2003 and 2004 pertained to the JDZ with Nigeria; a
third round was held in 2010 for STP’s EEZ.
7. A third party, the South African Procura Financial Consultants, which had previously
investigated opportunities to establish a Free Trade Zone in STP, later withdrew fol-
lowing disputes over contractual terms (Bru¨mmer 2007).
8. ERHC was battling bankruptcy and an investigation by the U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) regarding its role in a bribery case involving Congressman William
Jefferson (Bru¨mmer 2007). Proceedings regarding ERHC were formally closed in April
2012.
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9. Though overall a loss-making operation, ERHC sold some of its participating interests
in Santomean oil blocks in 2006, making US$45.9 million. It also received US$51.8
million from JDZ signature bonuses.
10. The mission resulted from a contentious 1999 agreement granting PGS exclusive rights
to conduct seismic research in STP’s EEZ during a ten-year period (Seibert 2006, 375).
11. Still, several PSCs regarding blocks 2, 3, and 4 were signed in 2005.
12. Signature bonuses from the JDZ licensing rounds have amounted to US$324 million,
of which STP received approximately 40 percent. The JDZ’s total budget from 2004
to 2013 has been US$92,464,297, of which STP’s nominal contribution has been a little
more than a third. However, US$22 million of this amount has been loaned to STP by
Nigeria (EITI 2014).
13. The SEC defines proved reserves as those “which geological and engineering information
[obtained usually by drilling] indicates with reasonable certainty can be recovered from
known reservoirs under existing economic and operating conditions” (Mitchell et al.
2012, 30). Possible and probable reserves are calculated to exist with some reduced
probability.
14. This development coincided with ERHC’s sale of assets to Addax and Sinopec and the
signing of PSCs indicating future plans for test drills in the JDZ.
15. The report estimated oil production to start in 2012, with a future production of 70,000
barrels per day for twenty years, and annual receipts of up to US$396 million.
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